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Jeremy Reid 
What is suggested by the term Progress is the idea of moving onward, whereas the meaning of it 
here is quite as much the prevention of falling back. The very same social causes—the same 
beliefs, feelings, institutions, and practices—are as much required to prevent society from retro-
grading, as to produce a further advance. Were there no improvement to be hoped for, life 
would not be the less an unceasing struggle against causes of deterioration; as it even now is. 
Politics, as conceived by the ancients, consisted wholly in this. The natural tendency of men 
and their works was to degenerate, which tendency, however, by institutions virtuously admin-
istered, it might be possible for an indefinite length of time to counteract.  
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, chapter 2  
Did Plato think that the lawcode given in the Laws should be changed by its 
citizens? Because the Laws is Plato’s most detailed political work, establishing 
the extent to which Magnesia’s legal and political norms are dynamic or static 
constitutes much of the framework for our understanding of Platonic political 
philosophy in practice. While much ink has already been spilled on the issue of 
legal change in the Laws, I contend that the relative consensus in the scholarly lit-
erature, which claims that the laws can and should be changed, is mistaken or at 
least seriously misleading.1 In particular, commentators have not been careful in 
1 The most forceful voice defending the fixity of Magnesian laws is Klosko 1988, 82 who writes 
that, ‘the laws of Magnesia are to be all but completely resistant to change’; Klosko, however, thinks 
that Plato has been inconsistent because he believes that the Nocturnal Council are given the authority 
to change the laws, and that the Guardians of the Law are given the authority to improve the law, 
1998, 84; 2008, 464-465 (see also Stalley 1983, 81-82). The conservative position, however, is very 
much the minority view (Nightingale 1999, 118 holds it but provides little argument). By contrast 
(working backwards chronologically), O’Meara 2017, 111-112 writes that the ‘Guardians of the Laws 
will be able to legislate in making changes in the law, adjusting and improving it as time and need 
require’ and that ‘the Nocturnal Council…will make of legislation, not something that is absolute in 
itself and unchangeable, but a means, a political instrument, to be constantly modulated and 
improved.’ Annas 2017, 84 argues that, ‘the Magnesian law code, once established with its main aim 
clear, is to be regarded as settled. Law making is not to be a normal part of Magnesian politics or civic 
activity’, but then qualifies this in reference to the ambassadors and the Nocturnal Council, claiming 
that, ‘Magnesians laws, while they have solid and stable principles, may need to be adjusted in the 
light of changing circumstances and new ideas that arise abroad. A city will never maintain its level 
of virtue and civilization if it isolates itself completely from other cities and refuses to learn from for-
eign ideas. This is only to be expected, given the way Magnesia has been produced on the basis of 
considerations from history and experience’ (142). Schofield, in his notes to Griffith 2016, claims that 
the Guardians of the Law will have the duties of ‘reviewing, revising, and supplementing the body of 
law’ (204n13). Marquez 2011, 188 writes that, ‘Plato’s defence of the rule of law never rules out the 
possibility of improving the law through the accumulation of new experience’ (see also his 2012, 
360). Schöpsdau 2011, 577-585 argues that the Nocturnal Council, by means of the Guardians of the 
Law who form part of that group, correct and improve the law in response to changing circumstances 
and new information. Brisson and Pradeau 2007 claim that the Guardians of the Law ‘ont pour rôle de 
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distinguishing three questions: 
(1) Are there legal mechanisms for changing the law in Magnesia?  
(2) What are the attitudes of Magnesian citizens towards innovation and legal 
change? 
(3) What are Plato’s general views about the authority of law and knowledge? 
These are importantly distinct issues. The first question concerns the constitution 
that the Plato has actually given us in the text of the Laws.2 Given the laws and 
institutions detailed, who would have the power to change the laws and how 
would they do it? The second question concerns how the citizens of Magnesia 
think about their laws. Do the citizens view the law as unchangeable, or do they 
think of the laws as something to be improved over time? The third question 
opens up the possibility that certain people—likely those with virtue and knowl-
edge—might be justified in acting above and beyond the legal framework of the 
existing constitution. Does Plato suggest that there are times when outstanding 
people are right to act in ways that are illegal? 
My focus is primarily on the first two questions, as this limits my project to the 
text of the Laws. Answering the third question adequately would require going 
further afield in the Platonic corpus and addressing a number of sophisticated 
arguments, though I end by pointing out how the position on the authority of 
knowledge from the Statesman is addressed in the Laws but ultimately dismissed 
as incidental to its project.  
In part 1, I consider the framework of offices (ἀρχαί) that structures the Mag-
nesian constitution. This directs our attention to the important question of who 
completer et de corriger la legislation élaborée par les législateurs primitifs’ (143) and that ‘ils 
n’hésiteront donc pas à améliorer la loi en procédant même à des expérimentations…ou à des adapta-
tions’ (144); as they elegantly state their view, the Guardians of the law allow for ‘une evolution qui 
ne soit pas une révolution’ (145). Meyer 2006, 380-382 says that the Guardians of the Law and the 
Nocturnal Council have the authority to change and repair the law. Bobonich 2002, 394-395 states 
that ‘there is an open texture to the political and social institutions that Plato sketches’ and that ‘Plato 
appears to assign to the “guardians of the law”…some important role in revising Magnesia’s laws’ 
(see also 395-408). Saunders 1995, 603 says that, ‘Magnesia is a shifting structure’. Cohen 1993, 314 
claims that, ‘though the legislator advises against any fundamental tampering with his scheme, by 
acknowledging the necessity for adaption, filling of gaps, and amendment he leaves room for alter-
ation of both substantive rules and rules regarding change… Just as the citizens of Magnesia can 
reject or amend the code initially proposed to them by the lawgiver, so can they at any time after its 
enactment change their mind and either start over or amend the existing code.’ Lewis 1998, 8 
declares, ‘it is incorrect to see the Laws as dedicated to a thoroughly static version of the law’. Brun-
schwig 1980 (attributing his view to De Romilly 1971) writes that Plato wanted a ‘lente mise au point 
des lois’ (518), and to proceed with ‘rectifications mineures’ (536). Morrow 1960, 200 states that the 
Guardians of the Law ‘are not merely to fill in the outline according to the principles that inspired the 
original legislators…but also revise or reject whatever does not in practice actually serve the purpose 
for which the laws are intended’, and that, ‘the original legislation will require to be replaced, rather 
than supplemented’ (200). Barker 1960, 353n1 is more cautious, noting that most laws are to be fixed 
after the trial period but also says that ‘it is not clear, though it seems to be implied, that [the Noctur-
nal Council] has a power of [legal] revision’. Thus, the vast majority of scholars believe that Magne-
sian law, ultimately, can be and should be changed.
2 I assume that the Athenian Visitor represents Plato’s own views. Readers not accepting this 
assumption should substitute ‘The Athenian Visitor’ for ‘Plato’ in the relevant discussions.
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can change the law. If no office is given the authority to change the law, then the 
law cannot legally be changed. More specifically, I argue that the Guardians of 
the Law (νομοφύλακες) have the authority to institute supplementary laws, but 
they do not have the authority to change them after the 10-year trial period. I also 
discuss the only explicit legal mechanism for changing the law, which involves 
the unanimous consent of (at least) all of the offices in times of emergency. 
Given the extremely high standard required for such a motion to pass, there is 
effectively no legal way to change the law in Magnesia.  
In part 2, I answer the second question by addressing the functions of the 
ambassadors (θεωροί) and the Nocturnal Council alongside the general attitude 
that Magnesian citizens have towards the laws. While the entirety of the popula-
tion is taught to have a reverential respect for the laws, a select few (who have 
already proven themselves as faithful to the laws) are allowed to question the 
quality of the Magnesian laws. Nonetheless, I argue that the functions of the 
ambassadors and Nocturnal Council can be adequately explained without making 
reference to their seeking to change the laws. Rather, the institutions of higher 
education in Magnesia are to have a superior understanding of the justification 
for the laws, thus grasping the law by more than habit alone, and are to keep the 
Magnesian education system up-to-date with important foreign discoveries. 
Innovation thus occurs within the framework of the existing laws but does not 
supplant it. 
In part 3, I briefly consider how the view from the Statesman that knowledge is 
always superior to law might undermine my reading of the Laws. I contend that 
Plato considers such a view about the ultimate authority of a knowledgeable 
statesman explicitly in the Laws but brackets such considerations as irrelevant for 
the practical task at hand. 
I conclude by considering the implications this interpretation of the Laws has 
for our understanding of Platonic politics in the history of political thought, sug-
gesting that Plato ultimately sees the task of politics as fighting to preserve good 
order against the decay and corruption caused by regular and predictable human 
failings. 
I. Institutional Mechanisms for Changing the Law  
Magnesia’s political system functions by means of legally appointed officers 
(ἄρχοντες), all of whom are subject to a scrutiny (δοκιμασία) before holding 
offices and an audit (εὐθύνα) after completing their term (761e5-6).3 While all 
commentators on the constitution of the Laws mention the various offices, recent 
work by Melissa Lane has highlighted the normative significance of office-hold-
ing in Greek political thought and in Plato.4 In order to act with political author-
3 The one exception to the audit rule concerns the Guardians of the Law who act as judges for 
cases where somebody prosecutes a high court judge; this presumably prevents an infinite regress of 
appeals (767e3-9). 
4 The institutional framework I use throughout has been inspired by Lane’s recent Carlyle Lec-
tures, forthcoming in a revised form with Princeton University Press. The importance of office as a 
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ity, one must be appropriately appointed to one’s office, be subject to the law and 
legal oversight, and be acting legitimately within the powers granted to that 
office. While it is of course wrong to assume that Plato simply imported all ideas 
of political authority from his historical climate, the Laws is explicit in the pow-
ers and the limits of power that it details for its office-holders. Because of this 
constitutional framework, it is fruitful to approach the issue of whether the laws 
of Magnesia can be changed by asking who can change the law and how are laws 
changed? In other words, which officers or group of officers are given the power 
to change the law, and what is the political mechanism by which they are 
changed? While it is important to discuss more general considerations for or 
against legal change, we should first look to the Magnesian constitution. 
A. The Legal Mechanism for Changing the Law 
Are there provisions for changing the law in the Laws? I contend that there is 
only one passage that explicitly provides a mechanism for changing the law in 
Magnesia. However, it is a matter of scholarly dispute which laws can be 
changed and by whom they can be changed. The passage occurs in book 6, and 
because every position on legal change in the Laws depends in some way on this 
text, I quote it in full: 
It is unavoidable, as we said, that on questions of this nature a 
lawgiver is going to leave out (ἐκλείπειν) all kinds of minor 
details, and that at any particular time it will be up to those 
with practical experience from year to year, having learned 
from use, to draw up regulations and amendments (τάττεσθαι 
καὶ ἐπανορθουμένους κινεῖν) on a yearly basis, until it is 
thought that these rules and practices have been determined 
sufficiently (ἕως ἂν ὅρος ἱκανὸς δόξῃ τῶν τοιούτων νομίμων 
καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων γεγονέναι). A reasonable measure of time 
for this trial and error—this applies to sacrifices and choruses, 
to overall arrangements and particular details—would be ten 
years, in collaboration with the lawgiver who drew up the 
arrangements, in his lifetime, and then after his death, each 
group of officials themselves referring any omission (το 
παραλειπόμενον) in their own area of responsibility to the 
guardians of the law for them to amend (ἐπανορθοῦσθαι), until 
they are satisfied it has been fully worked out in every detail. 
At that point they should declare their arrangements immutable 
(ἀκίνητα), and put them into practice alongside the other laws 
(τῶν ἄλλων νόμων) which the lawgiver who gave them their 
laws originally drew up for them. Concerning these (ὧν πέρι), 
they are never willingly (ἑκόντας) to alter any of them. But if at 
some point they decide they have been overtaken by some 
necessity (τις ἀνάγκη), then they should meet with all the offi-
normative political idea in Plato and Aristotle can be seen in her 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018a, and 2019.
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cials, the common people in its entirely, and all the oracles of 
the gods (πάσας μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς χρὴ συμβούλους, πάντα δὲ τὸν 
δῆμον καὶ πάσας θεῶν μαντείας ἐπελθόντας). And if they all 
agree, thus it is to change, otherwise not in any way at any 
time, but the one preventing it, following the law, is always to 
prevail (ἐὰν συμφωνῶσι πάντες, οὕτω κινεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ 
μηδέποτε μηδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν κωλύοντα ἀεὶ κατὰ νόμον 
κρατεῖν).5 (772a6-d4) 
It is clear that the Athenian takes the project of legislation in the Laws to be 
incomplete, as the lawcode we have is not everything that will be required for the 
city to work. Thus, the Guardians of the Law will need to supplement the legisla-
tion provided. Moreover, the Athenian details a trial period where laws may be 
altered, after which they said to be ‘unchanging’ (ἀκινήτα, see also 957a7-b5). 
Finally, in the above passage there is some mechanism for changing the law even 
after this trial period is over. 
Now to the two main issues of scholarly dispute. First, what is the scope of the 
authority to change the laws here—does it cover only the minor laws concerning 
religion and choruses (which are the subject of discussion in the context of the 
passage), or does the process generalize to all laws? Second, which people have 
to agree in order for the law to be changed, or, in other words, how is the implied 
veto from ‘the one preventing the change’ (τὸν κωλύοντα) supposed to work? 
The first issue arises from the ambiguity of the clause ‘the other laws’ (τῶν 
ἄλλων νόμων, 772c5). Because the genitive at the start of the next sentence picks 
up on this (‘concerning these’ [ὧν πέρι], 772c6) and the Athenian declares that 
those laws are never to be changed willingly (κινεῖν…ἑκόντας μηδέποτε μηδέν, 
772c7), ‘the other laws’ could suggest either that all laws in Magnesia are to be 
left unchanged or that only these kinds of laws are to be left unchanged.6 Gram-
mar alone suggests the wider scope, as there is no qualification on ‘the other 
laws’. But the argumentative context—minor pieces of religious legislation—
perhaps speaks in favor of a more restricted scope: if this were the Athenian’s 
general view about legal change, why would he embed it in such a specific dis-
cussion and without explanation of how it applies to the more important pieces of 
legislation? Moreover, if it did apply to all the laws, the procedure is strange—
why would the oracles need to be consulted about whether to change laws about 
farming or the marketplace regulations? Thus the text itself supports applying 
this procedure of legal change to all laws, but it perhaps shows a lack of 
hermeneutical sensitivity to generalize from this passage alone. 
But what hangs on the scope of this clause? Those who have defended or 
5 Translations are modified from Griffith 2016 unless otherwise stated. I use the Greek text of 
Diès 1951 for Laws i-vi and Des Places 1956 for vii-xii.
6 Note that it is not a viable strategy to say that Magnesians will never change the law willingly, 
though they may change the law with pain and regret if they think it best. The μὲν…δέ construction in 
772c7 clearly lays out the options as either willingly leaving the law unchanged or being forced to 
change the law by ‘some necessity’ (τις ἀνάγκη). Thus the unwilling changing of the law just is the 
mechanism described in the following lines. 
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acknowledged the narrow scope reading have generally taken it as a concession 
to the conservative position: while legal change may be permitted in minor mat-
ters, the text does not support legal changes in more serious matters, which are 
more important to keep fixed. However, as Marquez 2011, 194 points out, those 
defending the narrow scope reading have assumed that if you are not permitted to 
make changes in minor matters, then a fortiori changes to more serious matters 
are not justified. But that is not obvious: if legal errors are discovered in small 
matters, then there is no substantial threat to the development of the virtue of the 
citizens and the good functioning of the city; but if errors are discovered in the 
major laws, then it is crucial that these errors be rectified as soon as possible. 
Hence, major laws promise the most benefit and thus are the most important to 
change if they are found to be damaging. This is an ingenious line of argumenta-
tion. However, one could respond by saying that the importance of the major 
laws means that the risks of changing the legislation incorrectly would make 
things even worse and so extra caution is required. Thus, given this impasse, we 
should set aside the debate about scope ambiguity, as the grammar is indetermi-
nate and nothing follows philosophically from either interpretation. 
More pressing is the second issue, the mechanism for legal change detailed in 
the passage. Who is involved with changing the law and what is the procedure 
they use? The text says that ‘they’ (presumably, but not stated explicitly, the 
Guardians of the Law) should meet with all the officials, all the people, and all 
the oracles (πάσας μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς χρὴ συμβούλους, πάντα δὲ τὸν δῆμον καὶ 
πάσας θεῶν μαντείας ἐπελθόντας), and that all must agree or be in harmony 
(συμφωνῶσι) for the law to be changed (κινεῖν), otherwise it is not changed in 
any way (ἄλλως δὲ μηδέποτε μηδαμῶς).  
So which people have a say in this process? It appears that the Athenian is sug-
gesting a massive assembly where everybody gets to vote and everybody gets a 
veto (Klosko 2008, 461). Given that there are at least 10,080 citizens (there are 
5040 households, and women are not excluded: 785b5-6, 804d6-806c7) and the 
oracles are to be consulted too, that is a lot of potential vetoes.7 If this is the 
mechanism Plato has in mind, then it would truly be a miracle of collective action 
and social harmony for a motion to change the law ever to be passed; the laws, as 
Klosko 2008, 461 puts it, would be ‘all but impossible to change’. 
Though such an interpretation is a natural reading of the text, it is also a very 
literal reading and practicality about institutional design speaks against it. More 
plausibly, what the Athenian means here is that the Guardians of the Law are to 
meet with the officers and the people collectively (i.e., in the assembly, as is sug-
gested by the singular πάντα δὲ τὸν δῆμον).8 So rather than each citizen having a 
7 It is unclear which oracles Plato had in mind (note the plural), and thus how many they num-
ber. Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon are mentioned in a different discussion at 738c1-2. I say ‘at least 
10,080 citizens’ because it is possible that the adult children of each of the 5040 households also get 
to vote (thus increasing the number of voting citizens well beyond 10,080), but there is also some 
suggestion that the additional children are sent off as colonists elsewhere (740d5 -e8).
8 Marquez 2011, 191, which rightly cites Statesman 298c3 and Politics 1305a34 as parallels for 
this phrase to indicate the people as an assembly. Taylor’s note ad loc also seems to suggest this read-
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vote, the assembly as a whole decides whether to change the law, and then if they 
speak against the change, the motion to change the law is vetoed. While reducing 
the citizen body to one collective veto certainly makes the process easier than if 
each individual citizen had a veto, how much easier would it in fact be to pass a 
law with this revised mechanism? Marquez seems optimistic that it would make 
legal change substantially easier, to the point where it could be a regular mecha-
nism for legal improvement, but is he right? 
Addressing this question depends partly on how many offices there are in 
Magnesia and whether each officer gets a say or just each office.9 On the most 
minimal reading, there are at least 20 offices the Athenian describes in the Laws, 
and even if we exclude the 360 council members, there are still easily over 150 
sitting officers in Magnesia.10 To be sure, it is easier to pass a motion if only 25 
or 150 people have vetoes than if 10,080 did, but the details here are genuinely 
puzzling and is no easy way to resolve the difficulties.11 Do the country wardens 
and judges of athletic competitions really get a say in whether laws should be 
changed? The text explicitly says all offices and yet for a process as important as 
ing: ‘i.e. after ten years of preliminary experiment a change in the regulations shall only be possible if 
it is desired by the body of magistrates, the popular assembly, and the representatives of the oracular 
shrines unanimously. The dissent of any one of these authorities shall be fatal to an innovation’.  
Thanks also to Emily Hulme for emphasizing this reading to me. She notes that if Plato wanted to 
include every citizen individually then πάντες πολῖται would have been the obvious linguistic choice, 
whereas πάντα δὲ τὸν δῆμον strongly suggests ‘the whole of the people’ acting collectively.
9 τὸν κωλύοντα speaks in favor of the literal reading that Klosko defends, but it could stand in 
for τὸν κωλύοντα ἄρχοντα, which is ambiguous between ‘the office preventing it’ and ‘the officer 
preventing it’. The masculine probably speaks in favor of the latter (the feminine is more commonly 
used for the abstract ‘office’), but it does not settle the issue. 
10 The offices I am counting (and the number of office-holders) are as follows: Guardians of the 
Law (37), Generals (3), Infantry Colonels (12), Cavalry Colonels (12), Cavalry Commanders (2), 
Priests (number unspecified), Exegetes (3), Temple Treasurers (exact number unspecified), Country 
Wardens (60), City Wardens (3), Market Wardens (5), Judges of Artistic Competitions (2) Judges of 
Athletic Competitions (3), the Officer of Education (1), and the Auditors (minimum 12). I am not 
counting any of the judges, because their term does not last beyond the case they are judging, nor am 
I counting the marriage overseers, nurses, mess-hall supervisors, ambassadors, or the Nocturnal 
Council, because it is not clear whether Plato considers them offices. 
11 It is still far from easy to pass legal changes with a group of this smaller number. Part of the 
impetus to reform the Articles of Confederation of the Continental Congress was that the existing 
procedures required unanimity from all thirteen colonies to make changes. As Carey 2001, xxii-xxiii 
explains the situation, ‘In practice, the unanimity requirement rendered it virtually impossible to 
amend the document even if an overwhelming majority of the States favored change. The inability to 
act on these provisions necessarily doomed the Articles of Confederation to extinction, because the 
Continental Congress was helpless to correct flaws in the system or to adapt it to changing circum-
stances.’ It might also be helpful to consider a parallel with unanimous decisions from the nine 
Supreme Court Justices of the United States. Between 1946 and 2009, the court voted unanimously in 
33 of the 139 cases (23.7%) for a decision that altered legal precedent, and voted unanimously in 
2017 of 6399 cases (31.5%) in cases where there was no precedent alteration (see Epstein, Lee, and 
Posner 2012, 703). Obviously the Justices are not Magnesians and we should expect unanimous deci-
sions to be fewer for each increase in the number of parties, but these statistics may at least be a help-
ful place to start thinking about the likelihood of legal changes being passed by unanimous vote.
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changing the laws, Plato has been frustratingly (and unusually) vague here. In 
fact, it is not even obvious that Plato is describing a formal voting and veto sys-
tem here at all.12  
But if we take a step back, we see that what Plato is emphasizing is that laws 
are only to be changed because of ‘necessity’ and that the necessity for changing 
the law has to be utterly obvious to everybody.13 The Athenian may not be 
requiring the literal unanimous vote of every citizen, but he is requiring that there 
be a unanimity rule or decision procedure for instituting changes to the law. This 
is very important from the perspective of political science and institutional 
design. Indeed, given that Plato is happy to use majoritarian voting elsewhere in 
the Laws, the stringency of this particular process is sufficient to show that 
changing the law is intended to be maximally difficult. Furthermore, the passage 
gives us reason to think that no one person or office may change the law unilater-
ally—legal change is a collective matter. So however the details are filled out, 
multiple offices and authorities need to be consulted and all must agree. This is 
significant for determining whether particular offices are granted the power to 
change the law. 
What, then, can we conclude from the 772a6-772d4 passage? Well, while 
there is some legal provision for changing the law, the process is astonishingly 
difficult and no single office is assigned the power to change the law. Thus, legal 
change on the basis of the described procedure would not be a normal occurrence 
in Magnesia; rather, it is an unwilling response to a kind of necessity or emer-
gency, only to be used in situations where it is clear to everyone that a law must 
be changed.  
B. The Guardians of the Law and the Power to Amend the Laws 
It may be objected that I have been too quick in my conclusions from the pre-
vious discussion—are the Guardians of the Law not given the power to change 
the law in other passages?14 While the 772 passage suggests that they must act in 
concert with the other officers and the people, other passages have been taken to 
12 Thanks to Melissa Lane for this point. She suggests as a possibility that Plato may have some-
thing in mind not dissimilar to practices in British common law, where laws that are in general not 
followed by average citizens are eventually struck from the record. Thus the population as a whole 
are ‘in harmony’ that the law should be changed, but not because of a formal vote taken in an assem-
bly. Her suggestion is insightful (especially given that it would explain why this legal change need 
not undermine the habituation of the citizens—the legal change would not result in a change of social 
norms). I worry that adopting this understanding fails to make sense of the way in which the 
Guardians of the Law are supposed to meet with the offices and people (συμβούλους, 772d1). Per-
haps, though, there may be a good reason why the Athenian does not mention a formal voting process 
here, namely, that a vote is unnecessary—all the needs to be done is one of the relevant parties to 
voice formal dissent for the motion not to pass. The simplicity of the decision procedure obviates the 
need for counting individual votes.
13 Griffith captures the sense well by translating τις ἀνάγκη as an ‘emergency’, though it does 
mask the ἀνάγκη/ἑκόντας interplay.
14 See n1 for numerous commentators who claim that the Guardians of the Law have the power 
to change the law. Morrow 1960, 200-201 is especially representative and explicit on this point.
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suggest that the Guardians of the Law can act unilaterally.  
Even careful readers of the Laws may be forgiven for getting the impression 
that Guardians of the Law can amend the laws, for that is how the vast majority 
of translators render the Greek and there may be technical language here that has 
escaped our notice. Consider the following: 
ἆρ’ οἴει τινὰ οὕτως ἄφρονα γεγονέναι νομοθέτην, ὥστ’ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πάμπολλα 
ἀνάγκε παραλείπεσθαι τοιαῦτα, ἇ δεῖ τινα συνεπόμενον ἐπανορθοῦν…. Οὐκοῦν 
εἴ τίς τινα μηχανὴν ἔχοι πρὸς τοῦτο, ἔργῳ καὶ λόγοις τίνα τρόπον διδάξειεν ἂν 
ἕτερον εἴτε μείζονα εἴτε ἐλάττω περὶ τοῦτ’ ἔχειν ἔννοιαν, ὅπως χρὴ φυλάττειν καὶ 
ἐπανορθοῦν (769d4-e2 and e5-8)  
Griffith: Do you think there has ever been a lawgiver so foolish as to be unaware 
that there are inevitably going to be any number of things left for someone com-
ing after him to amend… In which case, assuming he had some mechanism for 
this purpose—a way of teaching somebody else through instruction and example 
to have an understanding, to a greater or lesser degree, of how best to preserve or 
amend laws 
Des Places: Crois-tu qu’il y ait eu législateur assez inintelligent pour ignorer qu’il 
reste fatalement un très grand nombre de défauts et qu’un autre devra les cor-
riger avec attention…. Et si l’on avait quelque moyen d’arriver à ce but, si 
quelqu’un savait comment apprendre à un autre, par le précepte ou l’exemple, à 
se pénétrer plus ou moins bien de la façon don’t il faut conserver ou corriger les 
lois 
Saunders: Do you think there’s any legislator so stupid as not to realize that his 
code has many inevitable deficiencies which must be put right by a successor… 
So if a legislator were able to discover a way of doing this—that is, if by instruc-
tion or pointing to concrete examples he could make someone else understand 
(perfectly or imperfectly) how to keep laws in good repair by amending them 
Bury: You cannot suppose that any lawgiver will be so foolish as not to perceive 
that very many things must necessarily be left over, which it will be the duty of 
some successor to make right… Suppose then that a man knew of a device indi-
cating the way in which he could teach another man by deed and word to under-
stand in a greater or less degree how he should conserve or amend laws 
Pangle: Do you suppose there’s any lawgiver who is so imprudent as to be igno-
rant of that fact that he must necessarily have left very many such things that 
require being set right by some follower… So if someone had some device indi-
cating the way in which, by deed or by words, he might teach another to under-
stand more or less, how he ought to guard and set right the laws 
Schöpsdau: daß da ein Gesetzgeber so unverständig sein wird, daß er nicht 
erkennt, daß zwangsläufig viele derartige Mängel übrig bleiben warden, die 
irgendein Nachfolger berichtigen muß….wie er durch praktische und durch the-
oretische Belehrung einen andern irgendwie dazu bringen kann, daß er mehr oder 
weniger Einsicht dafür besitzt, wie man Gesetze bewahren oder berichtigen muß 
ὅθεν νομοφύλακες χρὴ τὰ πρέποντα τῇ νῦν γεννωμένῃ πολιτείᾳ κατασκευάζειν 
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συλλογισαμένους καὶ ἐπανορθουμένους, ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις διαβασανίζοντας, ἕως 
ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτῶν ἕκαστα δόξῃ κεῖσθαι, τότε δὲ τέλος ἐπιθέντας, ἀκίνητα οὕτως 
ἐπισφραγισαμένους, χρῆσθαι τὸν ἅπαντα βίον. (957a7-b5)  
Griffith: From these the guardians of the law should put together procedures 
appropriate to the political system which is now coming into being; they should 
collect and revise these, submit them to the test of experience, until they are sure 
that the procedures for various situations are satisfactory. At that point they 
should call a halt, give them the seal of irreversibility, and make use of them their 
whole life through. 
Diès: C’est là que les gardiens des lois doivent aller chercher de quoi constituer 
une législation qui convienne à la cité que nous sommes en train de créer: ils 
trieront, corrigeront, éprouveront aux leçons de l’expérience chacune de ces 
prescriptions jusqu’à ce qu’ils les aient reconnues valables et, seulement alors 
terminant leur examen, les marqueront du sceau qui les rends intangibles et s’en 
serviront toute leur vie.  
Saunders: The Guardians should examine them and touch them up after trying 
them out in practice, until they think they have licked each single one into shape; 
then they should finalize them, ratify them as immutable, and render them life-
long obedience. 
Bury: From these the Law-wardens must construct a code which is suitable to the 
polity we are now framing, partly by comparing and amending them, partly by 
submitting them to the test of experience, until each such ordinance be deemed 
satisfactory; and when they have been finally approved, and have been sealed as 
absolutely unchangeable, then the magistrates shall put them into practice all 
their life long 
Pangle: the Guardians of the Laws ought to select what is fitting and equip the 
regime that is now being brought forth. They should consider these pieces of leg-
islation, correct them, and test them by experience, until each of them should 
seem adequately established; then they should set them up as final, seal them as 
simply unchangeable, and employ them for the whole of the city’s life. 
Schöpsdau: aus denen die Gesetzeswächter das Geeignete entnehmen und der 
jetzt entstehenden Staatsverfassung anpassen sollen, indem sie es durchdenken 
und verbessern und es in der Praxis ausprobieren, bis sie den Eindruck haben, 
daß alles befriedigend geregelt ist; dann erst sollen sie dies zum Abschluß brin-
gen und in dieser Form als unveränderlich besiegeln und es das ganze Leben hin-
durch an wenden.  
The Guardians of the Law are clearly given the power to ‘amend’ the laws and 
the deficiencies of the original lawgiver. The problem is that ‘amend’ is ambigu-
ous in English between changing and supplementing. This is especially important 
in a legal context: an amendment to a law could be either a change in the law that 
amounts to repealing or revising a previous law, or it could be an addition to the 
original law.15 That the Greek verb in question (ἐπανορθόω) is translated inter-
15 In the constitution of the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment is an example of an 
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changeably in English as ‘correct’, ‘set right’, ‘revise’, in French as ‘corriger’, 
and in German as ‘berichtigen’ strongly suggests that translators have the chang-
ing meaning in mind. Recall that it is uncontroversial that the Guardians of the 
Law are to fill in the gaps that the original lawgiver leaves behind—their supple-
mental function is clear; do these passages also grant additional powers to the 
guardians to change the law?  
It is not obvious they do. The first passage quoted (769d4-e2, e5-8) clearly 
states that the amendments are to be for areas that the original lawgiver left aside 
(παραλείπεσθαι; Taylor thus translates ‘lacunae’).16 This is also the sense that we 
saw in the 772 passage where the where the amendments to be made were 
regarding areas that the original lawgiver left out (ἐκλείπειν, 772b1 with 
ἐπανορθουμένους, 772b3; το παραλειπόμενον, 772c2-3 with ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, 
772c3). Further evidence for the amendment-as-supplementation reading can be 
gleaned from 781b4, where the Athenian corrects (ἐπανορθώσασθαι) the ‘omis-
sion’ (μεθειμένου, 781a6) in Megillus and Kleinias’ cities that allowed women’s 
lives to go unregulated.17 With respect to the second quoted passage above 
(957a7-b5), the interpretation that the Guardians amend in the sense of ‘supple-
ment’ also works here, as the legislation collected from elsewhere is unlikely to 
be complete for the Magnesians’ purposes. Moreover, whatever amendments to 
which this passage refers occur during the trial period after which the laws are 
explicitly said to remain fixed, thus this passage does not grant to the Guardians 
of the Law the ability to change the law either.  
amendment that changes that law (effectively repealing the three-fifths compromise), while the Bill 
of Rights (the first ten amendments) is an example of supplementation.
16 Note that ‘deficiencies’ is also ambiguous between failings and gaps. I do not think that these 
texts show that the original lawgiver has made mistakes.
17 An especially clear passage concerns the function of the ambassadors at 951c3-4: τὰ δ’ 
ἐπανορθούμενον, εἴ τι παραλείπεται, considered in the next section. The verb also shows up in two 
passages earlier in the Laws before the formal legislation has begun: at 644b3 the Athenian talks 
about correcting (ἐπανορθοῦσθαι) an education that has gone astray, and at 653d4 the Athenian 
explains how festivals correct for (ἐπανορθῶνται) the deterioration of education of the course of a 
human life. I grant that the former passage is an instance of revising (we do not want to supplement 
bad habits—we want to change them [cf. Aristotle, EN 1165b19]), but the latter suggests that festi-
vals are supposed to be a counterbalance to the natural deterioration people experience. Thus the 
weight of evidence is on the amendment-as-supplement reading in the legislative passages I consider. 
I am not saying that ἐπανορθόω cannot mean ‘reform’, ‘revise’, ‘improve’, or ‘correct’—it can; 
rather, my point is that we should ask what is being corrected for (the error of the lawgiver or his 
omission?) and when it is being used in the sense of ‘amendment’, whether that should be disam-
biguated as  ‘revision’ or ‘supplementation.’ My preferred translation is ‘amend’ precisely because it 
captures in English the ambiguity in the Greek. For parallel passages elsewhere in Plato, see Resp. 
425e5 and 426e5—is the problem here that bad lawgivers keep changing their mind about the origi-
nal laws or that they keep supplementing the original bad lawcode to try to fix the problems that 
arise? So too Tht. 143a2-5, where Eucleides, with Socrates’ help, is able to ‘correct for’ the parts of 
the dialogue with Theaetetus that he could not remember—are these omissions or errors? An excel-
lent example of the usage I have in mind is Symp. 180d2 where Agathon ‘amends’ (ἐπανορθώσασθαι) 
the earlier speeches by introducing an important distinction between the nature of Erôs and its effects; 
the earlier speakers did not get this distinction wrong, they just missed it; this usage is also seen at Prt. 
340d6-8, where the ‘correction’ is Socrates’ introduction of the being/becoming distinction. 
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Finally, there is unambiguous Greek for changing the law using the verbs 
κινεῖν or μεταβάλλειν. For example, Aristotle’s discussion in Politics ii 8, which 
is clearly about changing the law, makes extensive use of these verbs (1269a3-
27). Plato also uses κινεῖν and μεταβάλλειν in explicit passages about changing 
the law (e.g., 772d3, 797d9, 798a3, b7, d2), and frequently uses the cognate 
ἀκινήτα (‘unchanging’) to describe the status of laws that are not to be altered 
(e.g., 736d1, 798b1, 816c6, 846c6-7, 957b4). By contrast, Demosthenes uses 
λύειν to designate a repeal of an existing law (e.g., Against Leptines 20.1, 6, 14, 
58, 87, 96, 98, 99, 143; cf. Herodotus i 29.1, in reference to the Athenians not 
being able to repeal [λῦσαι] the laws Solon had laid down). The Athenian 
nowhere grants the Guardians of the Law the power to λύειν, κινεῖν, or 
μεταβάλλειν τούς νομούς. Thus, any ascription of the power to change the laws 
to the Guardians of the Law depends on the understanding of ‘amendments’ to 
the law. 
Given the arguments above, we should read the passages about amending the 
laws in a way that is consistent with what everybody agrees is a power explicitly 
granted to the Guardians of the Law, namely, that of supplementing the incom-
plete original lawcode. Nowhere does the Athenian say that the Guardians of the 
Law may unilaterally change the law after the trial period (though even during 
the trial period I believe their primary function is supplementary); indeed, the 
Guardians themselves are the ones who are explicitly said not to change the laws 
after this period (μὴ κινεῖν, 816c6). The Guardians are to finish the law, not to 
alter it (Nightingale 1999, 118). 
With these considerations in place, we can now consider more fully the painter 
analogy, from which the 769d-e passage is taken: 
Suppose someone took it into his head to paint the most beauti-
ful painting possible—and what is more, one that would never 
deteriorate, just go on getting better with the passage of time. 
You can see, can’t you, the painter being mortal, that unless he 
leaves behind him some successor able to make good any dam-
age to the painting by time, or embellish it and improve it, in 
the case of any defect resulting from the painter’s own defi-
ciencies in technique then all his great labour will last but a 
short time (συννοεῖς ὅτι θνητὸς ὤν, εἰ μή τινα καταλείψει 
διάδοχον τοῦ ἐπανορθοῦν τε, ἐάν τι σφάλληται τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ 
χρόνων, καὶ τὸ παραλειφθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ 
πρὸς τὴν τέχνην οἷός τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔσται φαιδρύνων 
ποιεῖν ἐπιδιδόναι, σμικρόν τινα χρόνον αὐτῷ πόνος παραμενεῖ 
πάμπολυς;)… Well, what about the lawgiver? Don’t you think 
he has the same kind of intention? First, to paint his canvas of 
laws with all the precision he can muster; second, as time 
passes and he tries out his ideas in practice, do you think there 
has ever been a lawgiver so foolish as to be unaware that there 
are inevitably going to be any number of things left for some-
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one coming after him to amend, if he wants the political 
arrangements and organization of the city he has founded to go 
on getting better and not worse? (769b8-e2, Griffith trans.) 
The relation of the Guardians of the Law to the original lawgiver is analogous to 
that of a master painter and his successors who are tasked with preserving the 
painting over time. The first thing to note is that this is hardly a good image for 
Plato to use if he wanted to show a dynamic process of change from an origi-
nal—preservationists would be fired if they substantially changed the painting. 
As the Athenian expresses the point a few lines later, their ‘job will be to fill in 
the outline’ (τοῦτο δὲ δεήσει συμπληροῦν ὑμᾶς τὸ περιηγηθέν, 770b8-c1; see 
also 779c7-d2). This explains the first implication of the analogy, namely, that 
the original lawgiver has been as precise as he can be, but that there will 
inevitably be gaps.  
What of the second point, that parts will need to be amended because of ‘any 
defect resulting from the painter’s own deficiencies in technique’? Griffith’s 
translation is loose in this sentence generally—and he is to be forgiven because 
of a tricky anacoluthon, but we can work around this.18 The relevant question is 
whether Plato is here saying that amendments will be required because of failures 
in the original lawgiver’s skill. Meyer 2006, 380, for example, argued on the 
basis of this passage that ‘it is inevitable for the work of legislators to be imper-
fect, and to require correction by subsequent lawmakers’ (cf. Morrow 1960, 
502). But Griffith’s translation is not the only possible rendering.19 The phrase τὸ 
παραλειφθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὴν τέχνην would better be 
translated as ‘what is left over because of his own weakness with respect to his 
technique’; this captures the ambiguity of the Greek, in that the πρὸς phrase 
(‘with respect to his technique’) could be qualifying τὸ παραλειφθὲν (‘what is 
left over’) or τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ (‘because of his own weakness’). So the 
phrase could mean either that the painter has technical deficiencies (i.e., he is 
incompetent in some respect, as the translators take it) or that the painter has a 
weakness that causes there to be issues left over related to his work.20  
Given that we are nowhere led to think that the original lawgiver is deficient 
with respect to his technique, and the only kind of deficiency we are told that the 
painter has is that he is mortal, we should not conclude that the original lawgiver 
has made mistakes that the Guardians of the Law will later correct. Rather, the 
problems in this passage are the decay from time and the mortality of the original 
18 See the notes by Des Places and England ad loc. 
19 It should be noted that Des Places, Bury, Saunders, Pangle, and Jowett all render this phrase 
similarly to Griffith. It is a more natural reading, but a genitive sandwiched in the way I suggest is a 
common construction, and Plato may have used it here to avoid hiatus between ἑαυτοῦ and οἷός.
20 Note that while τὸ παραλειφθέν can be taken to mean ‘deficiencies’ in the extended sense of 
‘incompetence’, its primary and literal sense is the idea of ‘left aside’ or ‘left out’ (thus, a synonym of 
ἐκλείπειν), as we have already seen in a number of relevant texts. My reading of this passage thus has 
the virtue of making Plato’s use of these terms consistent and straightforward.
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lawgiver, which prevent him from finishing his own project.21 In that sense, both 
the original painter and lawgiver must hand over the project to successors to pre-
serve and complete. Their problem is that they will die—not that they are incom-
petent or made errors in the original.22 
This has been a complex philological discussion, but my goal has been to show 
that Plato is in fact much more careful in his linguistic choices than our transla-
tions suggest he is. If I am right, Plato has the Athenian use κινεῖν and 
μεταβάλλειν to designate changes in the law, while he uses cognates of 
ἐπανορθόω to refer to amendments that supplement what has been left out (the 
literal meaning of παραλείπω and ἐκλείπω) by the original lawgiver. This is 
important for our question about the legal status of changing the law in Magnesia 
because the Guardians of the Law are given the power to supplement the law but 
they are not explicitly given the power to change the law after the trial period. 
Because everybody agrees that the Guardians of the Law are given powers to 
supplement the law, the burden of proof is on interpreters who want to show that 
the Guardians also have the additional power to change the law. I contend that 
there are no texts in the Laws that give them such powers unilaterally.  
So much for the Guardians of the Law. Are there other offices that are able to 
change the laws? The answer, in short, is no. What about the Nocturnal Council 
(νύκτωρ συλλεγόμενος)? Interestingly, there are very few commentators who 
think that the Nocturnal Council can change the law directly, because the Noctur-
nal Council is not technically an office.23 Though it is comprised primarily of 
office-holders, the Nocturnal Council is not an additional βουλή, nowhere is it 
called an office, nor is it subject to the usual processes of scrutiny and audit that 
characterize legitimate office holding.24 Thus, any changes to the law issued 
from the Nocturnal Council itself would be done from outside the official consti-
tutional structure of Magnesia, and would thus be illegal. Following Morrow’s 
21 Note that the painting needs to be improved later (εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν…φαιδρύνων ποιεῖν 
ἐπιδιδόναι) because it will lose its luster from age (and weather)—not because the original was bad. 
Presumably the parallel here with the decay from age is that the law will lose its force unless there are 
people to explain in fresh terms what the law was getting at. Thanks to Julia Annas for this point. 
22 René de Nicolay suggests that we could also understand ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ as a 
kind of fatigue or limitedness; a human being simply does not have the physical and mental capacities 
to legislate for everything in their lifetime.
23 Cf. Bobonich 2002, 407-408, who says of the Nocturnal Council in relation to changing the 
law that, ‘the fact that Plato does not explicitly give it a formal role is a weak ground for thinking he 
intends to deny it any such role’. This comment is puzzling. Note, however, that Bobonich does not 
claim that the Nocturnal Council is given the sole authority to change the law. 
24 See Lewis 1998, 14-15 on the significance of Plato using the term σύλλογος rather than 
βουλή. For the normative significance of office and office-holding in Greek political thought, I have 
learned much from Lane 2018b and rely on her excellent and insightful analysis. It might be objected 
that classical poleis did not have complex, well defined administrations as contemporary govern-
ments do, in which case the line between rulers and non-rulers is much less clear (and thus less signif-
icant) than I am suggesting it is. Thanks to an anonymous referee and Josh Wilburn for raising this 
objection. If readers are unpersuaded about the importance of office-holding, then the argument will 
rest on what the Nocturnal Council is said to do, which I address in the next section.
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influential interpretation, we should understand the Nocturnal Council as exert-
ing indirect influence on the city but not wielding political authority directly.25 
The Nocturnal Council is no more part of the constitution of Magnesia than Yale 
Law School or Oxford University are part of the constitution of the United States 
or Great Britain. Regardless of how much political influence they may have, they 
have no official powers. Nonetheless, the Nocturnal Council and ambassadors 
(θεωροί) may reveal something important about Plato’s attitude towards legal 
improvement, and thus they are worth considering as part of our discussion more 
generally. I consider their role in the next section. 
But first, let us take stock. Our goal here was to ask whether there are legal 
provisions for changing the law in the text of the Laws. Specifically, we asked 
who would change the law, and how they would do it? As we saw, there is only 
one explicit legal provision for changing the law, and that comes in the 772 pas-
sage. This procedure is to be used under necessity, prompted by some emer-
gency, and requires the Guardians of the Law to consult with all of the offices 
and the people as a whole in addition to the oracles, all of whom have to agree for 
the legal change to be passed—one body preventing it is sufficient to keep the 
existing law in effect. Thus, it is extremely difficult to change the law in Magne-
sia using this decision procedure. We then considered whether particular offices 
are given the power to change the law. The only plausible candidates are the 
Guardians of the Law, but a close reading of the relevant passages shows only 
that they have the power to supplement the law and perhaps to change it during 
the trial period, but certainly not after this period, where it is explicitly said to be 
unchanged (ἀκινήτα). Thus, no office in the Laws may unilaterally change the 
laws, and there is only one (very stringent) procedure for changing the laws. If 
Plato’s explicit constitutional and legal provisions were put into practice, 
changes to the existing laws would occur very infrequently; ideally, they would 
not happen at all. 
II. Attitudes towards Legal Change and Innovation:  
the Citizens, the Ambassadors, and the Nocturnal Council 
The explicit constitutional and legal provisions do not settle all of the interest-
ing questions about legal change in the Laws. For while they reveal much about 
how Magnesia works in practice, these provisions do not give us the full picture 
about how Magnesians (or Plato) think about innovation more generally. My 
goal in this section, then, is to consider what the introduction of the ambassadors 
(θεωροί) and Nocturnal Council suggest about Magnesian attitudes towards legal 
innovation and progress. 
First, I consider passages that explain what many interpreters take to be the 
default attitude most citizens will have towards the law, namely, that they are ser-
vants to the law and should treat it as a divine authority. I then ask whether what 
we are told about the ambassadors and Nocturnal Council provides a counterbal-
25 Morrow 1960, 500-514. See especially 510: ‘no procedure is mentioned whereby the noctur-
nal council is to make its insight and intelligence effective in the affairs of the state’.
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ance to this attitude or whether the goals of this higher education and foreign 
travel are consistent with the views that ordinary citizens will hold. Many readers 
have suspected that these institutions, introduced in the last pages of this massive 
dialogue, provide a glimpse behind the veil and allow older, wiser, and more vir-
tuous Magnesian citizens to challenge and seek out improvements for existing 
legislation. While it is undoubtedly true that ambassadors and members of the 
Nocturnal Council will have a greater understanding of the laws and their justifi-
cation, it is worth exploring whether this greater understanding provides a basis 
for legal change and political innovation. I argue that the higher education in 
Magnesia bolsters the existing laws and provides valuable supplementation, but 
it is not a source of revision. 
A. The Average Magnesian Citizen 
Though relatively uncontroversial, it is worth reminding ourselves of the gen-
eral attitude towards the law and legal innovation that the average Magnesian cit-
izen is to have. This provides the background against which we can see more 
clearly how the ambassadors and Nocturnal Council differ from most citizens. 
In the first place, citizens and office-holders in Magnesia are to be strictly law-
abiding. Being a ‘slave to the law’ is held up as an ideal for the office-holders 
(δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου, 715d5; Annas 2017, ch. 4), and the Athenian explicitly 
approves of the Dorian practice whereby none of the youth inquire into which 
laws are right and wrong, but rather say with one voice that the law has been 
divinely established (634d7-e3). Regardless of whether or not some older citi-
zens eventually get to do so, young people will certainly not give criticisms of the 
laws. Furthermore, one of the explicit duties of the Guardians of the Law is to 
prevent ‘innovating’ in the citizen body (νεωτερισμῶν, 758c6). At various points 
throughout the Laws, it is not Sparta or Athens but Egypt that is upheld as a 
model for the new colony (Nightingale 1999; Rutherford 2013). This is because 
Egyptian law has been free from innovation for literally 10,000 years, at least 
with respect to the arts (656e5-6). Interestingly, the motivation for innovation is 
said to be pleasure, though such motivation can be made ineffectual by the divine 
sanction of the law (657b4; see also 700e2-3).  
This Egyptian attitude towards legal fixity is prominent in the discussion of 
education and of children’s games (797a7-799b9). What has not been sufficiently 
emphasized, however, is that the fixity of laws in children’s games is supposed to 
cultivate a general attitude of reverence for and happiness with the existing laws, 
and that for the process to work the laws need to be totally unchanged: 
Change, we shall find, is for all things (apart from outright 
evils) by far the most dangerous, whether it’s the seasons, the 
winds, the body and its diet, or the soul and its habits. That is 
pretty well true for everything—not true in some contexts but 
not in others—apart, as I have just said, from things which are 
downright evil…. Where the laws under which people have 
been brought up have remained, by some divine good fortune, 
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unchanged through many long ages, so that there is no mem-
ory, even through hearsay, of things ever being any different 
from the way they are now, this fills the soul full of awe and 
fear of changing the established order in any way. Some clever 
way of bringing about this state of affairs in the city is what the 
lawgiver has somehow or other to dream up. (797d9-798b6) 
In order to make the laws truly secure and revered, the citizens should not even 
think of things possibly being different. The Athenian goes on to suggest that it is 
because people become accustomed to innovating in their youth that they then go 
on to innovate later in life (note νεωτερίζοντας again in 798c3-4). Thus while it is 
certainly crucial that children’s games are to be left fixed, the justification for this 
is to prevent a desire for innovation in citizens once they are older.  
Meyer, citing a compelling parallel passage from the Republic, takes an earlier 
discussion on music (665c5-7) to show that Plato is troubled by innovation in 
musical forms but that innovation within the established forms is unproblem-
atic—indeed, it may even be a good way to fulfill our otherwise troublesome 
desire for novelty. ‘The variation [the Athenian] endorses here’, she says, 
‘must…involve variation within the sanctioned forms so that the citizens will not 
have to sing over and over ad nauseum a limited menu of songs; thus new songs 
can be introduced into the canon over time (cf. Rep. 424b-c). It is not to variety as 
such that the Athenian objections, but to the pursuit of variety that leads to aban-
donment of those features essential to making the music beautiful and appropri-
ate for education’ (2015, 284-285). So there could be any number of new sonatas, 
for example, just as long as nobody is playing any jazz. Meyer’s account sup-
ports what I argue is an unproblematic kind of novelty and change in the educa-
tion system and infrastructure of Magnesia, namely, changes in accordance with 
the existing legislative framework.26 
In sum, then, the ordinary citizen is trained not to desire particular kinds of 
novelty and any attempts at innovation in form are discouraged. While the impor-
tance of keeping laws fixed is highlighted for children’s games in particular, their 
function is to instill a more general contentedness with the laws, lest citizens 
come to think that whatever does not change is boring or old-fashioned. But is 
this the only attitude towards innovation in Magnesia, or are there some who 
counterbalance this conservatism and seek out more radical changes?  
B. The Ambassadors 
While foreign travel is banned for all Magnesians under the age of 40 (950d7), 
there are some people who are approved to travel abroad—the ambassadors 
(θεωροί, literally ‘observers’ or ‘spectators’).27 Though it only occupies a few 
26 Thanks to the anonymous referees for pushing me on this tension in the Laws and to Susan 
Sauvé Meyer for providing such an elegant solution. 
27 The ambassadors are not the only people who go abroad. Magnesia also sends out delegations 
to the major Panhellenic festivals, and on public business as heralds for diplomatic purposes (950d8-
9). I do worry about how the aged Magnesian Olympic team will fare, even with their rigorous gym-
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pages of text, the discussion of the ambassadors reveals something important 
about Plato’s openness to ideas that spring up elsewhere and how Magnesia 
develops over time. Thus even if the average citizen is not to think about how 
their way of life may be different, there are clearly some people in Magnesia for 
whom this is an important concern.  
What, then, are the specific functions and goals that the Athenian ascribes to 
the ambassadors? First, all those who go abroad (including those who compete in 
the Panhellenic games and festivals) will bring glory to Magnesia on account of 
their virtue and excellence. Thus, Magnesians are to be shining examples for oth-
ers. But what function will the ambassadors serve for Magnesia itself?  
A city with no experience of bad people and good, a city in iso-
lation, can never be properly civilised or complete, nor can it 
safeguard its laws unless it grasps them with real understand-
ing—mere habit is not enough. And there are always, among 
the population, people who are an inspiration—not many of 
them, but people whose company is worth its weight in gold. 
There are no more of them in cities with good laws than in 
those without; once on their track, the person who lives in a 
city with good laws should always be prepared to set out by 
land and sea in search of them—with a view to buttressing 
those of his own institutions which have a sound basis, or mak-
ing amendments if something is left out (ζητεῖν ὅς ἂν 
ἀδιάφθαρτος ᾖ, τὰ μὲν βεβαιούμενον τῶ νομίμων, ὅσα καλῶς 
αὐτοῖς κεῖται, τὰ δ’ ἐπανορθούμενον, εἴ τι παραλείπεται). 
Without this fact-finding and enquiry a city will never remain 
in perfect condition—nor again if the fact-finding is poorly 
carried out. (951a7-c5). 
There are a number of justifications for foreign travel here that are worth consid-
ering separately. The first reason is that a city in isolation cannot be sufficiently 
civilized and complete (ἥμερος ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τέλεος). It is unclear exactly 
what this amounts to, but Plato is surely aware that there are many advances in 
civilization and culture that an isolated city will miss out on (I consider some of 
these advances below).  
Second, the law cannot be preserved (διαφυλάττειν) by habit alone without 
understanding (see also 951e5-952a5). This is a revealing line, especially given 
the debates about levels of citizen virtue in Magnesia and the importance of 
habituation in the Laws. Even if many of the citizens have little philosophical 
understanding, here the Athenian makes clear that some people in the city need to 
progress beyond mere habit. Foreign travel is important for this task so that Mag-
nesians can be exposed to other ways of life, and to consider the various merits 
and (many) errors of other societies.  
Most importantly, ambassadors are tasked with finding good people who will 
make secure (βεβαιούμενον) the existing laws and amend them if something is 
nastic training. 
430
left out (τὰ δ’ ἐπανορθούμενον, εἴ τι παραλείπεται). This is a particularly nice 
pairing of the key terms that we saw in the discussions of the Guardians of the 
Law, and it is clear that the ambassadors are to aid the Guardians in their project 
to supplement and complete the Magnesian lawcode. Once again, though, I do 
not think that this wording suggests that the ambassadors are on the lookout for 
ways to change the laws; rather they are searching for ways to correct for any 
gaps that the original lawgiver may have left. Upon their return to Magnesia, the 
Ambassadors would suggest these amendments to the Nocturnal Council (951d3-
952b5), whose sitting office-holders could then pass them onto the other 
Guardians of the Law or to the educational and artistic offices for collective con-
sideration. This provides a clear example of how it is that the higher education of 
Magnesia could exercise an indirect influence on the governance of the city.  
But what about new ideas? Will the ambassadors not discover genuinely good 
innovations? Of course they will. The Athenian says, ‘If [the ambassador] has 
come across people with something worth saying on the subject of lawgiving or 
education or upbringing (περὶ θέσεως νόμων ἢ παιδείας ἢ τροφῆς), or if he has 
come back with some ideas of his own, he shall share these with the committee as 
a whole’ (952b6-9). And as Annas 2017, 142 rightly asks, what is the point of 
finding out good ideas about these things if the Nocturnal Council is not going to 
do anything with them? 
There are plenty of helpful additions to the city that the ambassadors will dis-
cover abroad. Consider education. The ambassadors would do much to help 
Magnesia by bringing back, for example, books that detail new scientific, medi-
cal, and mathematical advances (Taylor 1960, lx-lxi notes the substantial mathe-
matical advances of the 4th century), new artworks, new gymnastic regimes or 
treatises on military tactics, martial technologies, histories (especially those that 
emphasize the importance of lawfulness and the evils of war), and, most impor-
tantly, philosophical developments.28 While these things will need to be consis-
tent with the laws and educational goals of Magnesia, my point is that there is 
plenty that the ambassadors could find abroad that advances such goals. It is clear 
that Plato does not want Magnesia to be an uncivilized backwater, and it is unrea-
sonable to think that everything outside of Magnesia will be unacceptable or 
inconsistent with its goals. Recall also that the ambassadors are supposed to be 
on the lookout for good people—whatever it is that they are working on is likely 
to be helpful for furthering the understanding of Magnesians.  
Thus, because we have considered all the explicit duties that the Athenian pro-
vides, it is far from obvious that the goal of the ambassadors is to seek out legal 
changes, though they are clearly supposed to enrich the city’s understanding and 
develop its levels of civilization. Commentators have not been sufficiently cre-
ative in their thinking about how Magnesian education could be advanced with-
out changing the law—Plato has no reason to shield the citizens from domed 
28 See also 811e4: one of the duties of the Officer of Education is to find artworks that are ‘akin’ 
(literally, ‘brothers’) to the lawcode, put them in writing, and use them to educate children, as 
Nightingale 1999 emphasizes.
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roofs, aqueducts, discoveries about conic sections, propositional logic, or the ner-
vous system, even though the ambassadors may not be bringing back much Cat-
ullus. Once we see how much could be added within the framework of the Laws, 
it is unsurprising that Plato would want to send people abroad to keep up to date 
with these important discoveries.29 That being said, it is also clear that Plato 
wants the ambassadors and members of the Nocturnal Council to have a deeper 
understanding of the justification for the laws. What happens when Magnesians 
come to have political knowledge? Are they to leave the laws fixed even then? 
To answer these questions, we must consider the role of the Nocturnal Council 
more fully.  
C. The Nocturnal Council 
Barker 1960, 398-399 memorably introduces the Nocturnal Council as fol-
lows: 
In the last book the veil is lifted, and we see clearly the figures, 
hitherto hidden, of guiding and controlling wisdom. Here the 
normal Greek institutions of assembly and council, officials 
and courts of laws, which appeared in the earlier books, begin 
to fade away; and instead there appears a nocturnal council of 
philosophers, or rather of philosophic astronomers, who guide 
the State because they know the mysteries of the heavens. Here 
too the law-state, rigid in character, unalterable in its rules, to 
which Plato has hitherto sought to ascribe the stability of an 
Egyptian Pyramid, unchanged and unchanging through the 
centuries, begins to dissolve; and the outlines of a State based 
on the free play of reason and guided by ‘genuine free mind’ 
reveal themselves in its place. 
Many readers—including Aristotle (Pol. 1265a2-4)—have suspected that the 
introduction of the Nocturnal Council is in deep tension with the structure of the 
established constitution. Though it is undeniable that one gets a different impres-
sion from the end of the Laws than earlier books, impressions can be misleading 
and we are perhaps too eager to see the more-familiar Republic in the darker 
thickets of the Laws. Let us look closely, then, at the specific powers and respon-
29 Overemphasizing this point may generate a genuine tension here with the passage about inno-
vation quoted earlier (797d9-798b6). Will citizens not get excited about the new discoveries and artis-
tic works coming in from abroad (even if they are morally wholesome) precisely because they are 
new? More generally, what is to stop the citizens from coming to love novelty in the new artistic 
works that are being produced in Magnesia (the Officer of Education and judges of artistic competi-
tion have as one of their main jobs approving new works for public performance, 801c8-d6, 802b1-
c4)? Perhaps Plato’s point is that as long as the standards of evaluation and rules for composition 
remain the same, as in Egypt, they will not be of a new type even if they are new tokens (as Meyer 
2015, 284-285 suggests). Or perhaps the new works are introduced so infrequently that there will not 
be an expectation for innovation. Nonetheless, we should note that even within Magnesia new artistic 
works are being produced in a culture that suppresses innovation, so the ambassador’s project in this 
respect does not introduce a further problem.
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sibilities that the Athenian ascribes to the Nocturnal Council and see if their role 
accords with the understanding of Magnesia developed thus far. 
First, who is part of the Nocturnal Council? The gathering is composed of (a) 
the 10 oldest Guardians of the Law, (b) all those who have won awards for excel-
lence (presumably from among the auditors, 947a1-e5), (c) those who have been 
ambassadors, (d) the current Officer of Education and all previous Officers of 
Education, and (e) one person aged 30 or over, selected by each of the people in 
(a)-(d) and approved by all of them (951d6-e5; 961a2-b8).30 Thus, while it is 
composed of office-holders and their apprentices, the Nocturnal Council is not 
itself an office.31  
What are the responsibilities they are assigned? The Nocturnal Council’s pri-
mary role is to be an institution of higher education.32 Their formal description 
comes very late in the Laws, though they are alluded to earlier in book 7 as a 
small minority of the population that engages in more advanced study of arith-
metic, measurement, and astronomy (818a1-4), and in book 10 as sending mem-
bers to speak with good-natured atheists who have been imprisoned 
(908e5-909a5), a task which requires a good deal of theological and philosophi-
cal acumen. In book 12 they said to know the target of statesmen and how to hit 
it, and to know which laws and people counsel well or badly (962b6-9); they 
have a sufficient knowledge of virtue (964c7), can view the many and the one, 
and order things towards that end, looking towards one single form (965b7-c3); 
they have real knowledge of the truth about the fine and the good, and the gods 
(966a5-d3); they know about the primacy of soul, its immortality, the role of 
intelligence (νοῦς) in astronomy, the connection between music and ethical 
habits and laws, and how to provide logical explanations (967d4-968a).  
As with the ambassadors, the members of the Nocturnal Council are to grasp 
the laws by more than habit alone. They are to have a superior understanding of 
what the laws aim at and how it is that the laws achieve their goal. But it does not 
follow from this that the Nocturnal Council will seek to change or repeal the laws 
of Magnesia. Rather, if the laws laid out in the Laws do in fact promote the virtue 
of the citizens and the well-being of the city, the Nocturnal Council will come to 
realize why the laws are good laws and how they improve the souls of the citi-
zens. So when the members are said to know which laws and people counsel well 
30 The Officers of Education are included in the first cited passage, but not the second. 
31 Commentators have been far too insensitive to the fact that half of the Nocturnal Council is 
composed of young people—people who are potentially 20 years too young to be Guardians of the 
Law. Given Plato’s insistence on age restrictions even for minor offices (you cannot be tasked with 
judging a choral performance in Magnesia until you are 40, 765a1-2), it would be astonishing if he 
gave so many inexperienced and untested people substantial political power, regardless of how clever 
or promising they might be. 
32 It may appear that the Nocturnal Council has a legislative function on the basis of 968c3-7, but 
this passage should be read in light of the next comments that the Athenian makes: the problem is that 
there is no point in legislating for a body like this before it has been established, because they will be 
the ones in the best position to decide what they should study, when they should study it, and for how 
long they should study it (968c9-e5).
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or badly, this need not mean anything more than that they can recognize why the 
laws of the other cities they consider may prescribe badly in comparison to their 
own laws, which prescribe well. Learning does not make the Nocturnal Council a 
source of legal innovation—quite the opposite. 
But how does this explain why the Nocturnal Council preserves the city and its 
laws, keeping it from harm (968a5-b1)? It is here that I think Mill’s point in the 
quoted epigraph is truly insightful for understanding the Laws. It is very tempting 
for us to think that the city’s guardians must preserve the city by intelligently 
responding to continually changing and difficult new circumstances. But does 
Plato consider these causes of political degeneration in the Laws? Not obviously. 
It might be argued that surely, if anyone, Plato would think of the task of politics 
is to respond to the endlessly changing sensible world. But this does not seem to 
be a major concern in the Laws. Plato’s metaphysics may be one of Heraclitean 
flux, yet his psychology does not predict major variation across people and time. 
Rather, the causes of human vice and failures in education and politics are regu-
lar and predictable.33 The Athenian’s priority is to avoid people overturning the 
good laws laid down, and to stop them falling victim to common errors that 
undermine good character development—valuing human goods over divine 
goods, being corrupted by excessive political power or illicit pleasures, and so 
forth. The Nocturnal Council, then, is charged with the unending project of 
teaching each generation anew why the structure of the city is good and why its 
goals should be maintained.34 If the laws are followed only by habit, the city will 
be helpless when citizens inevitably challenge the laws and their authority (con-
sider especially the good-natured atheists from book 10). With the establishment 
of the Nocturnal Council, Plato can provide for his citizens a rational and com-
prehensive response to such challenges. It is in this way that the Nocturnal Coun-
cil preserves the laws and values of Magnesia.35  
33 Melissa Lane has rightly pointed out to me in correspondence that Statesman 294b-c is rele-
vant here. In that passage, law is characterized as stubborn and ignorant, not altering its judgment 
even when somebody thinks of something new and better than what the law prescribes. Law, being 
simple, is thus (in a sense) inappropriate for the complexity of human life, which is never simple or at 
rest (ἡσυχίαν). But it is this very insight that prompts the Eleatic Stranger to ask why it is necessary to 
make laws at all, and his answer is that it is possible to give general rules that work for most people, 
most of the time. Thus, I believe that Plato’s view is that the principles of political psychology are 
regular and stable enough to justify a conservative position regarding legal change in Magnesia. 
34 Mill continues: ‘Though most men in the present age profess the contrary creed, believing that 
the tendency of things, on the whole, is towards improvement; we ought not to forget, that there is an 
incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse, consisting of all the follies, all 
the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of mankind; which is only controlled, and 
kept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly, and others by fits, 
put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects. It gives a very insufficient idea of the impor-
tance of the strivings which take place to improve and elevate human nature and life, to suppose that 
their chief value consists in the amount of actual improvement realized by their means, and that the 
consequence of their cessation would merely be that we should remain as we are.’ (Considerations of 
Representative Government, ch. 2, p. 197)
35 A useful parallel here might be with our contemporary project of teaching critical reasoning 
skills to college students. We do not expect experts in critical reasoning to make ‘new contributions 
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We thus need not read the closing comment that the city should be ‘handed 
over’ (παραδοτέον) to the Nocturnal Council in a way that reintroduces philoso-
pher-rulers at the end of the day (969b3).36 The project of the Laws as a whole is 
to justify and construct a feasible city that aims at the virtue and thus the happi-
ness of the citizens. The Athenian has been leading this discussion because he 
has sufficient experience and training to explain to his Dorian interlocutors what 
the law should aim at and how it is that the laws achieve their goal. Once it has 
been established, the members of the Nocturnal Council will be able to continue 
on the Athenian’s behalf. Thus it is not the Guardians of the Law or the citizens 
of Magnesia who are handing the city over to the Nocturnal Council, but the 
interlocutors of our dialogue. That, I think, is why the dialogue ends with the 
Nocturnal Council and why the Athenian says then that the city is to be handed 
over to them. Magnesians will not need to go in search of their original lawgiver 
for answers to their questions—they will need only to go to someone on the Noc-
turnal Council, who will explain to them the justification for the lawcode.37  
But what if the Nocturnal Council’s wisdom and understanding ultimately sur-
passes that of the original lawgiver, and they come to recognize that some of the 
laws established are not the best? Would they not then be justified in changing 
the existing laws? Not necessarily. In the first place, the Athenian explicitly says 
that Magnesia does not have the best laws—he is legislating for humans and not 
for gods (739d6-e6; 853c3-d4). Magnesia was not supposed to be optimal, it was 
supposed to be good.38 The Athenian surely thinks that these laws will work 
(why else would he propose them?) and so it may be sufficient for the Nocturnal 
Council to show that the Athenian is not mistaken in this respect. Even if in prin-
ciple some law might be more effective at developing the virtue of the citizens, if 
in practice the laws are working well, then it is not obvious that they should be 
 
to the literature’ on which argument forms are valid and which are fallacious. Rather, the task is the 
same year after year, as it has been for millennia: to explain why certain forms of argumentation are 
good, and to explain why, regardless of how compelling some of them may be psychologically, falla-
cies are bad forms of reasoning. The task of the teacher of critical thinking is to establish good pat-
terns of thinking and then to guard against tempting corruptions. There is no end to this project, even 
if it does not change annually.
36 Klosko 1988; 2008. Ultimately, I do not find Klosko’s arguments for the shift in Plato’s view 
from the earlier books to these closing passages compelling, primarily because one of the key texts 
about leaving the law fixed and unchangeable after the trial period comes at 957a7-b5—after the dis-
cussion of the ambassadors and a mere four Stephanos pages before the main discussion of the Noc-
turnal Council. To say that Plato changed his mind (multiple times?) while writing these dozen pages 
is implausible, and though books 11 and 12 are perhaps a hodgepodge of miscellanea compiled by 
Phillip of Opus, I think it is better to try to think about other ways in which the Nocturnal Council 
might be consistent with the strict legal constitutionalism of the earlier books.
37 This is also the way in which I think the Laws responds to the critique of writing in the Phae-
drus. The legal writings will be preserved and their wisdom defended by living people who guard the 
laws and understand the system that justified them.
38 Hence there may be Solonian parallels here, in not giving the best laws but the laws that the 
people can accept (Plutarch, Life of Solon, xv 1-2).
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changed.39 Changing a good law because it is not optimal would incur substantial 
costs in Magnesia. There is not space to develop this point fully, but suffice it to 
say that the habituation of the citizens and their respect for the law depends in 
large part on law being fixed and seen as divine, rather than as a tool to be used 
by fallible mortals to further their individual goals (even purportedly good goals). 
Thus the costs of introducing the possibility of legal change may outweigh the 
putative benefit of the new law (recall especially 797d9-e2).  
But what if the Nocturnal Council discovered not only that some law is not 
optimal, but that it is in fact outright bad, undermining the goal of the lawcode? 
Would they not be justified in changing it then? Perhaps. We should remember 
that there is ultimately some provision for changing the law—though it is an 
exceedingly difficult process. It is possible, though, that Plato just does not think 
any of the laws he proposes are bad. The Laws does not read like a provisional 
project upon which other philosophers and lawgivers are to improve after his 
death. Details will need ironing out, to be sure, but on the whole Plato thinks he 
has the right idea. For those who prefer a skeptical and intellectually detached 
Plato, this is not a welcome reading—but the Laws is no Socratic dialogue. The 
Athenian is not tentative about his ranking of goods, the goals of politics, and the 
appropriate system of education (even when his interlocutors disagree), nor does 
he suggest that there might be any number of effective ways to achieve these 
goals. So Plato likely expects the Nocturnal Council to further justify his conclu-
sions, not to overturn them, and they will not discover any bad laws given by the 
original lawgiver because there are not any. 
Thus, I do not think that either the ambassadors or the Nocturnal Council show 
that Plato is interested in having institutions of higher learning in Magnesia in 
order to allow future revision of the laws. Their main roles are to grasp the laws 
by more than habit, and to ensure that the lawcode will be filled out and its con-
tent kept up to date with advances that are consistent with the goals of the law. If 
they innovate, they do so within the existing legal framework. The Nocturnal 
Council and ambassadors preserve the laws by showing why Magnesian laws are 
superior to many existing alternatives (or are at least sufficiently good) and why 
they achieve the goals that they set out to. Thus we can see both why Plato would 
want to include the ambassadors and Nocturnal Council, and why they are con-
sistent with the rest of the constitutional arrangements described in the Laws. The 
supposed contradiction between the institutions of book 12 and the explicit Mag-
nesian laws dissolves once we read the text without the assumption that the insti-
tutions of higher learning are meant to undo what came before—the members of 
these institutions are the people who can explain why the laws are good and who 
can defend them against anybody who might challenge them. 
39 Compare Demosthenes 20.110: ‘In general, I think that then only ought you to praise the 
habits and character of other nations and decry your own, when it is possible to prove that they are 
doing better than you. As long as you (thank Heaven!) are doing better than they are, in public policy, 
in internal harmony, and in every other way, why should you belittle your national institutions and 
imitate theirs? Even if theirs could be proved superior in theory, yet the good fortune that you have 
enjoyed under your own institutions makes it worth your while to retain them.’
436
III. Law, Knowledge, and Authority 
There are, however, considerations from elsewhere in the Platonic corpus that 
suggest more complex ways in which law and knowledge might relate, and deter-
mine which is ultimately authoritative. While I cannot settle difficult questions 
about Plato’s views across multiple dialogues (especially concerning the Crito, 
Apology, and Republic), it is worth addressing one important consideration from 
the Statesman to which the Athenian alludes in the Laws. 
In the Statesman, the Eleatic Visitor makes clear that the only criterion of cor-
rectness of a constitution is whether the ruler has knowledge (292d2-8). This cri-
terion is explicitly distinguished from rule in accordance with written laws 
(293a7). So while knowledgeable statesmen will make use of written laws, their 
action is right if it proceeds from their knowledge, not if it is accordance with the 
laws—even laws that they knowledgeably laid down (295c7-296a4). Thus, an 
action that is in fact illegal according to existing legislation is not always a wrong 
action.40 Notably, though, the Statesman also suggests that in the absence of such 
a knowledgeable statesman ‘the principle that no one in the city should dare to do 
anything contrary to the laws, and that the person who dares to do so should be 
punished by death and all the worst punishments…is very correct and fine as a 
second choice’ (297e1-4, Rowe trans.). Whether anybody has more authority 
than the law, then, depends on how politically knowledgeable they are; if a per-
son did meet such a standard, then they would be justified in acting contrary to 
the law even though such an action may not be justified for anybody else in that 
society. Thus, it would be a mistake to think that law is the ultimate political 
authority for Plato, even though it is a very important source of authority. 
This view from the Statesman about the priority of knowledge is especially 
important given a parallel passage in the Laws. The Athenian Visitor makes 
explicit that, while human nature is prone to be corrupted by power, 
If there were ever a member of the human race of satisfactory 
character, who by some divine allocation of talent was born 
with the capacity to assume such power, he would have no 
need of laws to rule over him, since no law or regulation is 
more powerful than knowledge, nor is it right for mind to be 
the servant or slave of anything; rather (if it is the real thing, 
and in its nature truly free) it should be the ruler over all things. 
In reality, however—well, no such person exists, not in any 
place nor in any fashion, or only to a very limited degree. So 
we must opt for what is second-best: order and law. (875c3-d4, 
emphasis mine) 
Here the Athenian acknowledges that in the ideal case, a virtuous person with 
knowledge would have no need of laws, nor would it be right for law to rule over 
40 The qualification ‘illegal according to existing legislation’ is important if Plato holds an early 
version of the Stoic view that what is in accordance with right reason is in accordance with law, as 
may be suggested by the Minos dialogue. I bracket this conception of law here, as I am interested in 
actual written laws of cities—not what we might call cosmic or natural law.
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knowledge. But the lines that follow make it clear that the ideal almost never 
obtains and thus is not a relevant consideration for the administration of Magne-
sia.41 We should be careful to distinguish, then, between Plato’s unqualified ide-
als and the principles that he uses in applied political contexts, especially those 
labeled ‘second-best’. Because the Laws has a practical aim, one that does not 
rely on there being such outstandingly virtuous and knowledgeable people, it is 
easy to see why Plato does not consider such people making legal changes in the 
day-to-day administration of Magnesia—even if in fact they would be justified in 
making such changes. The axiological priority of the knowledgeable statesman 
over law is crucial to emphasize in the Statesman, but it is an aside in the Laws. 
Thus neither establishing the illegality of one person changing the law nor 
there being a general attitude against innovation in Magnesia entails that a virtu-
ous and knowledgeable person should not change the law if they are able to and if 
such a change would be genuinely beneficial. However, in practice, a lot depends 
on how high the standard is to qualify as such a person. If Plato thinks these peo-
ple are very few and far between, then even very good and intelligent people in 
Magnesia will not seek to change the law. Moreover, it is important to emphasize 
that the position I have been defending need not entail that one be unthinking 
about government, law, and political legitimacy. If Socrates is a model of Pla-
tonic lawfulness, then it might matter a great deal whether the people holding 
office, making laws, and giving orders are doing so legitimately. Magnesia may 
demand a high level of obedience from its citizens, but whether the same princi-
ples that obtain in Magnesia also obtain in other and more non-ideal states is very 
much an open question.  
IV. Evolution and Decay in Platonic Politics 
The conceptual space we have covered began with whether there are legal 
mechanisms for changing the law in Magnesia, and if so, who is given the author-
ity to make such changes. Though many commentators claim that the Guardians 
of the Law are given this power, a close reading of the text shows that this is 
unlikely to be the case. More plausibly, the Guardians are given the responsibility 
to complete the lawcode, but not to change it—as the Athenian says, their job is 
to fill in the outline. Nonetheless, there is one mechanism for changing the law 
when it is necessitated or there is an emergency, but for the motion to be success-
ful all of the offices must unanimously agree and the change is made unwillingly. 
Thus, legal changes in Magnesia will be extremely rare and difficult. 
I then considered whether the lack of legal mechanisms for changing the law 
also suggests a hostile attitude towards innovation in Magnesia. While the citi-
41 We might rightly worry that if the laws of Magnesia are not produced by people with knowl-
edge—either the Visitor himself or the office-holders—then the laws would be more in need of 
changing because of their inferior quality. Nonetheless, I think Plato’s position in the Laws is that the 
laws proposed are good enough such that they will not frequently be in need of reform (recall 797d9-
798b6) and that no knowledgeable statesman will arise such that they would be justified in reforming 
the constitution. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this important objection. 
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zens in general are discouraged from innovating, it is clear from the inclusion of 
the ambassadors and the Nocturnal Council that Plato is not opposed to all forms 
of innovation. It is in fact necessary for the preservation and civilization of the 
city that some citizens engage in a higher education and seek out advances that 
will be included in the education and governance of Magnesia. What we saw, 
though, was that it is important to distinguish between legal innovations and 
other kinds of innovation. Everything that the ambassadors and Nocturnal Coun-
cil discover and propose for inclusion in Magnesia needs to be consistent with 
the goals and laws of the original lawgiver. While it is important that the law be 
grasped by more than mere habit, the greater understanding that the higher edu-
cation of Magnesia provides is supposed to justify and preserve the original 
vision for the city, not to overturn it. Thus, the Nocturnal Council and ambas-
sadors will suggest supplementations to the law, but they are not given the 
authority to change the law nor is seeking out legal revisions the object of their 
studies. 
Finally, texts from both the Statesman and Laws suggest that when somebody 
is acting from knowledge or genuine political skill, they are not bound by the 
directives of existing law (even if the law was originally laid down from knowl-
edge). This suggests that there is a more complex relationship between right 
action and lawful action in Plato. Further work needs to be done on determining 
this relationship across the Platonic corpus, but it is worth noting that in the 
Laws, the consideration that somebody with political knowledge might rightly 
change the laws seems not to be of practical concern nor does such a considera-
tion find an institutional manifestation in Magnesia. 
No doubt some readers will baulk at just how conservative a position I have 
ascribed to Plato. But I began in the epigraph with Mill because he noticed some-
thing important about ancient political philosophy—something that I suspect is 
especially prominent in Plato—namely, that the task of politics is to establish 
something good and then to fight against its decay. Whether the problem of poli-
tics is ultimately about responding to the regular and predictable failures of 
humans, or whether is it ultimately about evolving to meet the new challenges of 
circumstance is a question not easily answered. What Mill points out in his dis-
cussion more generally, however, is that it is a mistake to think that the process 
of preserving good political order is inert, uncreative, or unreflective. Consider 
what he says in trying to show that conservative and progressivist values here are 
not as far apart as one might expect: 
If there is anything certain in human affairs, it is that valuable 
acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the 
same energies which gained them. Things left to take care of 
themselves inevitably decay. Those whom success induces to 
relax their habits of care and thoughtfulnesss, and their willing-
ness to encounter disagreeables, seldom long retain their good 
fortune at its height. The mental attribute which seems exclu-
sively dedicated to Progress, and is the culmination of the ten-
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dencies to it, is Originality, or Invention. Yet this is no less 
necessary for Permanence; since, in the inevitable changes of 
human affairs, new inconveniences and dangers continually 
grow up, which must be encountered by new resources and 
contrivances, in order to keep things going on even only as 
well as they did before. Whatever qualities, therefore, in a gov-
ernment, tend to encourage activity, energy, courage, original-
ity, are requisites of Permanence as well as of Progress.42 
Mill’s lesson for us here is that in order to preserve a political system, simply 
keeping it running well requires a great deal of energy, skill and, indeed, virtue. 
Thus we should not get the impression from Plato’s insistence on preserving the 
law that Magnesia’s citizens are mindless, brainwashed, or mechanical. Magne-
sians will be actively and creatively involved in improving their city in accor-
dance with the goals of the original lawcode, and will fight in each generation 
against the regular and predictable causes of political decay with whatever 
resources they can muster.  
Nonetheless, Mill also has a lesson for Plato, namely, that preservation might 
also require change. While the goals of the Laws may remain fixed, it may be that 
changing circumstance really does demand new means for achieving the same 
goals. Thus, keeping fixed the goals of the laws is not the same thing as keeping 
the laws fixed. But the extent to which Plato was right or wrong to think that to 
preserve his political goals meant preserving the original laws is a question wor-
thy of serious consideration.43  
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